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1. The Razor says: do not multiply entities without necessity! The Laser says: do not 
multiply fundamental entities without necessity! Behind the Laser lies a deep insight. 
This is a distinction between the costs and the commitments of a theory. According to 
the Razor, every commitment is a cost. Not so according to the Laser. According to 
the Laser, derivative entities are an ontological free lunch: that is, they are a 
commitment without a cost. Jonathan Schaffer (2015) has argued that the Laser 
should replace the Razor.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Sections 2-4 we shall discuss and argue 
against Schaffer’s arguments for replacing the Razor with the Laser. Schaffer 
considers several objections to his views, and in Sections 5-7 we shall argue that 
Schaffer does not deal successfully with two of them. In Section 8 we shall present a 
probabilistic argument for the Laser. However, the argument has a limitation and does 
not support the replacement of the Razor with the Laser. Indeed, it supports only the 
claim that, given certain assumptions, the multiplication of explanatorily relevant 
derivative entities does not matter; but, as we argue in the same section, there is an 
argument that multiplying explanatorily superfluous derivative entities does makes a 
theory less rationally acceptable. Section 9 is a brief conclusion.  
Before we start, let us explain and justify a conspicuous absence from this paper. 
Often philosophers distinguish between qualitative and quantitative economy (Lewis 
1973: 87). Qualitative economy refers to economy of kinds or types of entities, while 
quantitative economy refers to economy of token entities. This distinction thus 
delivers two versions of the Razor: (a) do not multiply types of entities without 
necessity (the qualitative Razor) and (b) do not multiply token entities without 
necessity (the quantitative Razor), and two versions of the Laser: (c) do not multiply 
fundamental types of entities without necessity (the qualitative Laser) and (d) do not 
multiply fundamental token entities without necessity (the quantitative Laser). But 
since Schaffer himself ignores the distinction (2015: 646), and the points in this paper 
apply equally well to the qualitative and quantitative versions of each of the Razor 
and the Laser, we shall not distinguish the qualitative and quantitative versions of the 
Razor and the Laser and shall instead interpret the Razor as commanding not to 
multiply entities (whether types of entities or token entities) without necessity and the 
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Laser as commanding not to multiply fundamental entities (whether types of entities 
or token entities) without necessity.  
 
2. Schaffer gives three arguments for the Laser. The first consists in an imaginary 
case that is supposed to show that the Laser, not the Razor, is what really accounts for 
certain theories being better than others. The case is as follows. Physicist Esther posits 
a fundamental theory with 100 types of fundamental particle. The theory is 
predictively excellent and is adopted by the scientific community. Then Feng comes 
along and builds on Esther’s work to discover a deeper fundamental theory with 10 
types of fundamental strings, which in varying combinations make up Esther’s 100 
types of particle. Schaffer describes this as ‘a paradigm case of scientific progress in 
which a deeper, more unified, and more elegant theory ought to replace a shallower, 
less unified, and less elegant theory (Schaffer 2015: 648).  
Schaffer thinks this example shows that what accounts for the superiority of Feng’s 
theory is the Laser, not the Razor. For Esther’s total ontology is a subset of Feng’s 
(both token-wise and type-wise) and so according to the Razor, Esther’s theory should 
be superior to Feng’s. But, Schaffer says, the Laser gets things right. For Feng posits 
fewer fundamental types of entities than Esther. Thus, Feng incurs more commitments 
than Esther (he postulates the strings, which are not postulated by Esther), but at a 
lower total cost (Schaffer 2015: 648-9). Thus, when comparing how economical 
theories are, one should compare how many fundamental entities they posit, not how 
many entities are posited overall. The Laser thus wins over the Razor, according to 
Schaffer.  
Although Schaffer sets up his example in terms of two theories that differ with 
respect to the number of fundamental types of entities they posit, nothing in his 
conclusion depends on this and it is clear that his conclusion is the more general one 
that what matters is economy of fundamental entities, both of fundamental types of 
entities and fundamental token entities. Although we shall understand Schaffer’s 
argument in this way, most of what we are going to say about it would be valid even 
if Schaffer’s conclusion were meant to be only that what matters is economy of 
fundamental types of entities. In particular, our assessment of Schaffer’s argument as 
fallacious would still stand if the conclusion of Schaffer’s argument were restricted to 
economy of fundamental types of entities.  
Schaffer’s argument is fallacious. Grant that Feng’s theory is better than Esther’s 
due to its positing fewer fundamental entities. Let us assume that this shows that 
theories positing fewer fundamental entities are preferable, all else being equal, to 
theories positing more. If so, this shows that the Laser is the correct rule for choosing 
between theories which differ with respect to the size of their fundamental ontologies 
but not with respect to the size of their derivative ontologies. Does it follow that the 
Laser should replace the Razor? No. If the Laser replaces the Razor, then only 
fundamental entities matter to ontological economy. To establish this, one must show 
not only that theories are better off for minimising fundamental entities, but that they 
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are no worse off for multiplying derivative entities. But nothing in the Esther and 
Feng case shows that multiplying derivative entities does not decrease simplicity in a 
way that makes theories defective. That is, the case of Esther and Feng does not show 
that we should prefer a theory T1 to a theory T2 if T1 posits both fewer fundamental 
entities and more derivative entities than T2. So Schaffer’s case of Esther and Feng 
does nothing to support his thesis that the Laser should replace the Razor.  
But Schaffer’s case of Esther and Feng cannot even show that the Laser is the 
correct rule for choosing between theories which differ with respect to the size of 
their fundamental ontologies but not with respect to the size of their derivative 
ontologies. For Esther’s and Feng’s theories differ also with respect to the size of their 
derivative ontologies: Feng’s has more derivative entities than Esther’s, since all the 
derivative entities of Esther’s theory, plus its fundamental ones, are derivative entities 
in Feng’s theory.  
Furthermore, Schaffer’s case does not even show that Feng’s theory is better than 
Esther’s due to having a more parsimonious fundamental ontology. As Baron and 
Tallant (2016: 4) also observe, nothing excludes the possibility that Feng’s theory is 
better for other reasons, such as being deeper, more unified, or more elegant. 
Specifically, we submit that the reason Feng’s theory is better than Esther’s is that it 
explains everything Esther’s theory explains and more, i.e., Feng’s theory 
explanatorily subsumes Esther’s theory. As we have just noted, the fundamental 
entities postulated by Esther are derivative entities in Feng’s theory. So Feng’s theory 
explains what Esther’s does not, and does not leave unexplained anything that 
Esther’s theory explains. Thus, the fact that Feng’s theory posits fewer fundamental 
entities is not needed to explain why his theory is better than Esther’s.  
A more relevant case to test the Laser would be either (i) one in which the 
fundamental entities of neither theory are the derivative entities of the other, or (ii) 
one in which the fundamental entities of either theory are the derivative entities of the 
other. This would control for the possibility that one theory is better than the other 
due to explanatory subsumption, rather than due to the size of its fundamental 
ontology.  
Consider, then, two theories, T1 and T2, which postulate exactly the same 
particulars and the same properties. T1 grounds properties in particulars. According to 
T1, particulars are fundamental, properties are derivative. Theory T2 grounds 
particulars in their properties. According to T2, properties are fundamental, 
particulars are derivative. Suppose, furthermore, that both theories posit more 
particulars than properties. In this case T1 has more fundamental entities than T2 but 
fewer derivative ones, and T2 has more derivative entities than T1 but fewer 
fundamental ones. Imagine that the theories are otherwise equally good. Irrespective 
of the total number of entities, the Laser tells us to go for T2, while the Razor remains 
silent.  
Is there any reason to prefer T2 on the basis that it postulates fewer fundamental 
entities? Yes, for fundamental entities are unexplained ones. Thus, a theory with 
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fewer fundamental entities leaves fewer things unexplained. And surely this is a virtue 
of theories (although, of course, since there are other virtues, having this virtue does 
not guarantee that the theory is better than the alternatives). Thus, there is an 
argument for the Laser, but it has nothing to do with the Esther and Feng case. (The 
same argument applies if we consider a case of two theories in which the fundamental 
entities of neither theory are the derivative entities of the other.)  
But this argument still doesn’t show that the Laser should replace the Razor. All it 
shows is that a theory postulating fewer fundamental entities is preferable to a theory 
postulating more fundamental entities, other things being equal. Indeed, imagine two 
theories, T1 and T2, such that T1 postulates 10 fundamental entities and no 
derivatives, and T2 postulates 9 fundamental entities that, together, ground 1000 
derivatives. If this is the only difference between the theories— if they are equally 
explanatory, and so on— it seems clear that T1 is the better theory, since T2 is 
unnecessarily profligate (but in Section 8 we shall give an argument that, under 
certain assumptions, one should prefer T2 in such a case). In this case, what explains 
the superiority of T1 is its better adherence to the Razor.2  
 
3. Schaffer’s second argument for the Laser is an argument by analogy. Distinguish 
the Conceptual Razor and the Conceptual Laser (Schaffer 2015: 649):  
 
  Conceptual Razor: Do not invoke concepts without necessity!   
  Conceptual Laser: Do not invoke primitive concepts without necessity! 
 
Schaffer argues that the Conceptual Laser is preferable to the Conceptual Razor 
and so, by analogy, the Ontological Laser is preferable to the Ontological Razor.  
Schaffer supports his claim that the Conceptual Laser is preferable to the 
Conceptual Razor by means of a conceptual analogue of the case of Esther and Feng. 
Georg has developed a regimentation of set theory in which, by means of 10 primitive 
concepts, he defines 40 other useful set-theoretic concepts. Hamsa builds on Georg’s 
work to discover an axiomatisation with just one single primitive notion. With her 
single primitive, Hamsa can define 99 other useful set-theoretic concepts, including 
Georg’s 40 set-theoretic concepts (Schaffer 2015: 649).  
Hamsa’s theory, Schaffer says, is methodologically preferable to Georg’s. Yet 
Georg’s total ideology of 50 concepts is a subset of Hamsa’s total ideology of 100 
concepts. Thus, the Conceptual Razor gets the case backwards (Schaffer 2015: 649-
50). Schaffer claims that in the conceptual domain it is only primitive concepts that 
count against the conceptual economy of the theory. Defined concepts are available 
                                                
2 This is similar to Baron and Tallant’s Charlie and Zibeon case (2016: 4). But in their case, 
the theory postulating fewer entities overall is also the one that displays greater explanatory 
unity. This prevents Baron and Tallant from being able to say that what explains the 
superiority of Zibeon’s theory is its better adherence to the Razor.   
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for free. Given the analogy between conceptual and ontological economy, Schaffer 
infers that the Laser is preferable to the Razor (2015: 650-51).  
The thought is roughly this:  
 
Defined concepts are not costly to conceptual economy.  
Defined concepts are to ideology what derivative entities are to ontology.3  
So derivative entities are not costly to ontological economy.  
 
But compare:  
 
 Simmering doesn’t change the colour of tomato soup.  
 Simmering is to tomato soup what grilling is to steak.  
 So grilling doesn’t change the colour of steak. 
 
This argument by analogy doesn’t work. There are respects in which simmering is 
to tomato soup what grilling is to steak— both are the standard cooking method 
relative to the foodstuff in question— but we cannot reliably infer that the analogy 
extends to effect on colour. Moreover, we have specific reason to doubt that the 
analogy holds in that respect: grilling turns steak from pink to brown due to the 
presence of myoglobin, which denatures into brown-reflecting hemichrome on 
heating; tomato soup lacks this feature. Similarly, there are respects in which defined 
concepts are to ideology what derivative entities are to ontology—both are the 
‘superstructure’ relative to the ‘basis’ (Schaffer 2015: 649)— but we cannot reliably 
infer that the analogy extends to effect on parsimony. Moreover, we have specific 
reason to doubt that the analogy holds in that respect, as we shall now argue.  
Why is it that primitive concepts incur a cost to conceptual economy, while 
defined concepts incur a commitment but not a cost? To find out, we must consider 
why conceptual economy is a virtue: what is the ‘good-making’ feature of 
conceptually economical theories, such that multiplying primitive concepts detracts 
from that feature, while multiplying defined concepts does not? Conceptual economy 
is a theoretical virtue because the more conceptually economical a theory is, the more 
intelligible it is. That is, assuming the primitive concepts of two theories, T1 and T2, 
to be equally intelligible, if T1 has more primitive concepts than T2, T2 is more 
intelligible than T1. Since defined concepts can be understood in terms of the 
primitives, multiplying defined concepts does not detract from the intelligibility of the 
theory. (We are assuming an ideally intelligent person— for normal people, it might 
be better to have more primitives, since some definitions might be hard to 
                                                
3 Schaffer (2015: 649). 
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understand). We suggest that this is why defined concepts incur a commitment, but 
not a cost, to conceptual economy.  
But the ‘good-making’ feature of ontologically economical theories is not 
intelligibility. By reducing the ontology of a theory—whether by the Laser or the 
Razor— one does not thereby increase its intelligibility. Other things being equal, a 
theory positing 100 particles is not thereby more intelligible than a theory positing 
101 particles; nor is a theory positing 50 fundamental particles thereby more 
intelligible than a theory positing 51 fundamental particles. One might point out that 
theories positing several different kinds of entity are less intelligible than theories 
positing fewer such kinds, especially where the entities are new or unusual. But this is 
an ideological matter: we need different concepts to understand different kinds of 
entity. Once we have the concept, electron, a theory positing 2 electrons is no more 
intelligible than a theory positing 1000.4  
So although, in some respects, defined concepts are to ideology what derivative 
entities are to ontology, we have reason to doubt that the analogy extends to effect on 
economy. Multiplying defined concepts incurs no extra cost, because it is only by 
multiplying primitives that one detracts from a theory’s intelligibility— the ‘good-
making’ feature of conceptually economical features. But intelligibility is not the 
‘good-making’ feature of ontologically economical theories. So we cannot infer from 
Schaffer’s analogy that fundamental entities are costs to ontological economy, while 
derivative entities incur a commitment but not a cost.5  
 
4. Schaffer’s third argument turns on what he calls the Ontological Bang for the Buck 
(Schaffer 2015: 651-652). Schaffer points out that good theories are not only 
economical but fruitful; that is, they exhibit both simplicity and strength. On the 
conceptual side of things, fruitful theories are those that are able to define many 
further concepts from only a sparse supply of primitives: Hamsa’s definition of 99 
set-theoretic concepts in terms of a single primitive is fruitful, in part, because she is 
able to define so many further concepts (Schaffer 2015: 651-652). Thus, Schaffer 
proposes the following as the underlying principle that unifies the virtues of 
conceptual simplicity and strength:  
 
Conceptual Bang for the Buck: Optimally balance minimisation of 
primitive concepts with maximisation of defined concepts (especially 
useful ones).  
                                                
4 What is the ‘good-making’ feature of ontologically economical theories? We suggest it is 
the likelihood of ontological adequacy, i.e. the likelihood of positing those and only those 
entities that are real. Other things being equal, and in particular if the theories are 
explanatorily equal, a theory positing 100 particles is more likely to be ontologically adequate 
than a theory positing 101 particles.  
5 See Baron and Tallant (2016: 6) for additional considerations against Schaffer’s argument 




In order to preserve the analogy with conceptual economy, Schaffer proposes an 
ontological analogue of this principle. Just as defined concepts are part of what makes 
a package of primitives useful, derivative entities are, for Schaffer, ‘part of what 
makes a package of fundamental entities useful. They show that these fundamental 
entities can be used to produce something’ (2015: 652). Thus, Schaffer proposes the 
following as the underlying principle that unifies the virtues of ontological simplicity 
and strength:  
Ontological Bang for the Buck: Optimally balance minimisation of 
fundamental entities with maximisation of derivative entities 
(especially useful ones). 
 
And if the single underlying virtue is the Ontological Bang for the Buck, Schaffer 
argues, then what it underlies is the Laser, not the Razor (2015: 653). It ‘pressures one 
to minimise fundamental entities (that’s the buck), and thus supports a specific 
methodological injunction not to multiply such fundamental entities where possible. It 
supports no methodological injunction against derivative entities, but actually favours 
the generation of derivative entities (that’s the bang)’ (Schaffer 2015: 653).  
What shall we say about this? Firstly, the only motivation for the Ontological Bang 
for the Buck is to preserve the analogy with conceptual economy: since that analogy 
fails, the motivation for the Ontological Bang for the Buck, and therefore Schaffer’s 
third argument for the Laser, is vitiated. However, it is worth spelling out why the 
analogy does not allow us to infer the Ontological Bang for the Buck from the 
Conceptual Bang for the Buck.  
On the conceptual side of things, the more concepts one can define from fewer 
primitives, the better: this increases intelligibility. The fewer the primitive concepts, 
the less it takes (for an ideally intelligent person) to understand the theory. Since 
defined concepts can be understood on the basis of primitives, they do not detract 
from a theory’s intelligibility. But the more concepts one can define in terms of the 
primitives, the better one understands the primitives. And even if a defined concept is 
eliminable, it can still increase intelligibility. If two concepts are interdefinable, then 
either can be eliminated with no loss to expressive power, but one concept might 
render the other more intelligible. This is why the Conceptual Bang for the Buck can 
encourage us to maximise especially—	rather than exclusively— defined concepts that 
are useful.  
On the ontological side of things, as we’ve said, generating entities does not 
increase intelligibility—it may even have the opposite effect, if describing an entity 
requires new conceptual apparatus. There is therefore no relevant analogy that could 
allow us to infer the Ontological Bang for the Buck from the Conceptual Bang for the 
Buck. It is hard to see, therefore, what could justify the injunction to maximise 
derivative entities, especially useful ones— why not only useful ones?  
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This leads us to our second point. Schaffer says very little about why generating 
derivative entities per se is to be encouraged. He only says that derivative entities 
show that the fundamental entities can be used to produce something. But this doesn’t 
explain why it is virtuous to generate derivative entities per se. And as we’ll now see, 
it is difficult to see what the explanation could be.   
Theories aim to describe and explain reality. The ideology of a theory refers to the 
means by which it expresses its descriptions of reality. The ontology of a theory refers 
to what the descriptions tell us reality is like, that is, to the objects, properties and 
processes they posit. Theories are ideologically virtuous, we’ve said, insofar as their 
means of expression make for more intelligible descriptions. But theories are 
ontologically virtuous insofar their ontological posits are real; it is difficult to see how 
maximising derivative entities per se furthers this goal. Generating derivative entities 
guarantees a more correct or complete description of reality only insofar as reality in 
fact contains the entities generated. One gets no more bang for one’s ontological buck 
by positing derivative entities, unless there is reason to believe that those entities 
happen to exist.6  
It seems, therefore, that a more plausible injunction would be to maximise 
derivative entities as long as they make for more correct descriptions of reality: 
surely, on the ontological side of things, this is the bang we want for our buck. But 
this injunction seems to comport well enough with the Razor. And it is hard to see 
how else we might benefit from multiplying derivative entities per se. To illustrate, 
note that the Ontological Bang for the Buck commits Schaffer to the idea that the best 
theories are those according to which every entity grounds at least one other entity. 
But it is difficult to see why such a theory is preferable to one which posits some 
entities that do not ground anything, assuming that the theories are otherwise equally 
good.  
In sum, without the analogy with conceptual fruitfulness, there seems to be no 
good reason to think it is virtuous to multiply derivative entities per se. The only 
reason would seem to be if one has a prior taste for fruitful orchards (even strange 
orchards, in which every fruit produces another fruit). Put another way, the only 
reason to accept the Ontological Bang for the Buck is if one already accepts that the 
                                                
6 Note that to say that theories are ontologically virtuous insofar their ontological posits are 
real is not to give a criterion by which to choose theories. One such criterion is, for instance, 
the Razor. The Razor presupposes that ontologically economical theories are more likely to 
posit only real entities, i.e. it presupposes that ontologically economical theories are more 
likely to be ontologically adequate and therefore ontologically virtuous. Another such 
criterion is the Laser, which presupposes that theories with a smaller fundamental ontology 
are more likely to be ontologically adequate and therefore ontologically virtuous. Similarly, to 
say that theories are ideologically virtuous insofar as their means of expression make for more 
intelligible descriptions is not to give a criterion by which to choose theories. One such 
criterion is, for instance, the Conceptual Razor, which presupposes that ideologically 
economical theories are more likely to be ideologically virtuous. Another such criterion is the 
Conceptual Laser, which presupposes that theories with fewer primitive concepts are more 
likely to be ideologically virtuous. Thanks to a referee for prompting us to clarify this point.  
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Laser should replace the Razor. For why should we permit the generation of 
derivative entities other than useful ones, unless we already think derivative entities 
are an ontological free lunch?7  
 
5. Schaffer considers four objections to his views. Here we shall argue that he does 
not deal successfully with two of them. We have just touched on the first of these—
the overgeneration objection, according to which the Bang for the Buck methodology 
invites us to spuriously overgenerate derivative entities. Schaffer uses the example of 
what he calls doubled mereology on which every sum has a counterpart with exactly 
the same proper parts. Doubled mereology gets double the bang for the same buck, so 
shouldn’t this version of mereology be a better theory according to the Bang for the 
Buck methodology? (Schaffer 2015: 656–57). 
Schaffer’s first answer to this objection emphasises that, according to the 
Ontological Bang for the Buck, one is supposed to generate especially those 
derivative entities which are useful; but the extra sums of doubled mereology have 
been put to no use. 	
                                                
7 Baron and Tallant give two counterexamples to the Ontological Bang for the Buck. The first 
consists of a case of two theories T1 and T2. According to T1 there exist 4 derivative entities 
and 1 fundamental entity, which grounds the 4 derivative ones. According to T2 there exist 3 
derivative entities, and 3 fundamental ones, where each fundamental entity grounds one of the 
derivative ones. The Ontological Bang for the Buck tells us to select T1 over T2. But this 
coincides with the recommendation of the Razor. Baron and Tallant criticize the Ontological 
Bang for the Buck for being agnostic as to whether we are trading simplicity with respect to 
the total number of entities off against the number of derivative entities produced, or whether 
we are trading simplicity with respect to the number of fundamental entities off against the 
number of derivative entities produced (Baron and Tallant 2016: 7). But we see no 
agnosticism in the Ontological Bang for the Buck: it is clear that it tells us to trade simplicity 
with respect to the fundamentals off against the number of derivative entities produced. The 
fact that in this particular case the result is the same whether the simplicity traded is with 
respect to the fundamentals or with respect to the total number of entities does not mean that 
the Ontological Bang for the Buck is not clear about the kind of trading off it recommends. 
The second counterexample adduced by Baron and Tallant consists of two other theories, T1 
and T2. According to T1 there exist 9 entities in total. 8 entities are derivative, 1 entity is 
fundamental, and the 1 fundamental entity grounds 4 derivative entities which, in turn, ground 
1 further derivative entity each. According to T2 there exist 11 entities in total. 10 entities are 
derivative, and 1 entity is fundamental, and the 1 fundamental entity grounds 2 derivative 
entities which, in turn, ground 4 derivative entities each. The Ontological Bang for the Buck 
counsels to select T2 over T1. The selection, Baron and Tallant (2916: 7) say, is not based on 
any trade-off between the number of fundamentals and the number of derivative entities, but 
on the fact that T2 gets more Bang for the Buck in virtue of the fact that it uses fewer 
derivative entities to do more work. But then the Ontological Bang for the Buck seems to 
recommend the Razor rather than the Laser, ‘since only the former can handle parsimony 
considerations directed at interlevel objects’ (2016: 8). Again, we do not see the rationale for 
the criticism here. That T2 uses fewer derivarive entities to do more work might be a reason 
to prefer T2 over T1, but the reason why the Ontological Bang for the Buck recommends T2 
is that it optimizes the balance between minimization of fundamental entities with 
maximization of derivative ones.  
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But this puts all the weight on how useful derivative entities are. If that is the case, 
the Ontological Bang for the Buck has little to recommend over and above the 
injunction: maximise derivative entities provided they are useful—	an injunction 
which, as we said above, seems to comport well enough with the Razor.	
Schaffer’s second reply is to emphasise that ontological economy and strength are 
not the only methodological principles. The problem with doubled mereology seems 
to be that its axiomatization requires less elegant axioms than those required by 
classical mereology which is, furthermore, the maximally permissive system that still  
obeys extensionality. Thus, for Schaffer, classical mereology strikes a further balance, 
namely it maximises bang for the buck and preserves extensionality (2015: 657). But 
since Schaffer is not in a position to show that all of the methodologically most 
virtuous theories are maximally permissive given certain plausible independent 
constraints, Schaffer offers as a last resort to withdraw the Bang for the Buck and the 
associated argument for the Laser, but still uphold the Laser on the basis of the other 
two arguments, since the Laser is compatible with the multiplication of derivative 
entities as purely neutral or as costly for independent reasons, but not as costly as 
fundamental entities, so that there is no collapse into the Razor (2015: 658). 	
But this line of retreat weakens the analogy between conceptual economy and 
ontological economy since the Conceptual Bang for the Buck is surely correct. Once 
the analogy is weakened, this must weaken his second argument for the Laser, since it 
is more difficult to see now why the analogy must hold in certain respects and not in 
others. Thus, this second reply to the objection has some collateral effects not noticed 
by Schaffer.	
Thus, the first reply amounts to undermining the value of the Bang for the Buck as 
a reason for the Laser, and so it leads to the abandonment of the third argument for 
the Laser. The second reply consists in withdrawing the Bang for the Buck and its 
associated argument for the Laser. Both answers result in the abandonment of the 
third argument for the Laser. Thus in so far as the overgeneration objection was an 
objection against the Bang for the Buck and consequently an objection against the 
third of Schaffer’s arguments for the Laser, the overgeneration objection has not been 
properly blocked. 		
6. We will now discuss the special sciences objection. Since the special sciences are 
not concerned with fundamental entities, the objection goes, the Laser offers no 
methodological guidance to theories in the special sciences. Thus, on the assumption 
that chemicals and organisms are not fundamental entities, the Laser offers no 
methodological guidance to chemists or biologists (Schaffer 2015: 661). Yet 
ontological economy seems to be relevant in the special sciences. The Laser fails to 
capture this.8 	
                                                
8 Baron and Tallant (2016: 8-11) present a detailed version of the special sciences objection. 
They do not, however, consider Schaffer’s reply, which is our focus here.  
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Schaffer’s reply turns on two cases, intended to illustrate two sorts of way in which 
economy principles are invoked in the special sciences (2015: 661). The Bigfoot case 
runs as follows. A strong objection to the claim that Bigfoot exists is that no data has 
been produced which hasn’t clearly been fabricated. But, says Schaffer, the objection 
here isn’t that Bigfoot would be an extra entity; it is that the simplest overall 
explanation is that hoaxsters have fabricated the data.9 This is an inference to the 
simplest explanation, ‘but not one involving concerns about the multiplication of 
entities. Neither The Razor nor The Laser is needed’	(2015: 661). 	
Schaffer’s second case—the telekinesis case—runs as follows. A strong objection 
to the claim that telekinetic powers exist is that, in order to explain how mind could 
act on matter without physical mediation, we seem obliged to posit some hitherto 
undiscovered fundamental force. Hence, ‘part of the reason for rejecting telekinesis is 
to avoid ontological costs at the fundamental physical level. Both The Razor and The 
Laser suffice to capture this’	(Schaffer 2015: 662). 	
Putting the Bigfoot and Telekinesis cases together, Schaffer draws the following 
conclusion: 		
[T]here is a very strong methodological constraint operative in the special 
sciences, which is to fit within the grounds provided by fundamental physics. (In 
general, derivative entities impose an indirect cost, in terms of whatever 
fundamental entities serve as their grounds.) This is part of what makes 
telekinesis so implausible. But I am also saying that there is no further economy 
constraint on special science tokens or types. This is why biologists have no 
economy-based constraints against positing one more squirrel, or one more 
species of roundworm. (Schaffer 2015: 662). 		
Thus, Schaffer’s reply to the special sciences objection consists in the two 
following points: (1) There is an ontological economy-based constraint on the special 
sciences—	fit with fundamental physics—	that the Laser suffices to capture; (2) This 
is the only ontological economy-based constraint on the special sciences; neither the 
Laser nor the Razor is needed otherwise. We will argue that neither of these claims is 
adequately motivated by the cases discussed. 	
The Bigfoot case makes the point that many apparent appeals to ontological 
economy in the special sciences may really be appeals to other sorts of economy. 
Perhaps, for instance, when Lavoisier repudiated phlogiston, he wasn’t concerned 
about the multiplication of entities, but with phlogiston theory’s needing ‘a number of 
                                                
9 As a referee pointed out, it is not entirely clear here whether the Bigfoot theory is positing 
one extra thing or one extra type of thing. But something Schaffer says suggests that for him 
it can be seen as positing either: ‘But note that the objection to Bigfoot is not that Bigfoot 
would be an additional entity. Indeed, I take it that (…) a biologist would have no qualms 
whatsoever about positing one more squirrel, or one more species of roundworm’ (Schaffer 
2015: 661).    
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inconsistent assumptions to explain facts easily explained by his [Lavoisier’s] theory’	
(Thagard 1978: 87). But the burden is on Schaffer to show that no case where 
economy is invoked (apart from cases involving fit with fundamental physics) turns 
on concerns about the multiplication of entities. For one thing, this is far stronger than 
the claim his opponents need to establish. For the special sciences objection to gain a 
foothold, it suffices that an important class of cases involve ontological economy; not 
every case must do so. Other cases may suffice to launch the objection even if, for 
instance, the above account of the repudiation of phlogiston is correct, or biologists 
indeed have no qualms about multiplying species of roundworm. For another thing, 
several cases have been argued to support the relevance of ontological economy in the 
special sciences, and Schaffer doesn’t discuss a single relevant one. Such cases 
include Baker’s (2007) discussion of pre-1950s theories of biogeographical 
distribution, and Nolan’s (1997) discussion of Avogadro’s hypothesis concerning the 
behaviour of gases in chemical reactions. Indeed, Baron and Tallant (2016: 8-11) 
argue explicitly that these cases favour the Razor over the Laser. Moreover, neither of 
these cases seem to involve concerns about fit with fundamental physics.10 Pace 
Schaffer (2015: 662), it is he who faces the burden of proof here, and the Bigfoot case 
does little to shift it. 	
Secondly, it is far from clear that Schaffer’s own example of ontological economy 
at work in the special sciences is a genuine case. According to Schaffer, positing 
telekinesis requires some novel mental force, thereby incurring ontological costs at 
the fundamental level—	costs the Laser can measure. But the objection here is not 
that this force would be an extra entity; it is that no such entity exists according to our 
best fundamental physics. We don’t need an economy principle here; we only need 
the principle that theories should not entail claims that conflict with our best science.	
Finally, Schaffer does not explain how the Laser captures the objection to 
telekinesis. He only states that ‘[i]n general, derivative entities impose an indirect 
cost, in terms of whatever fundamental entities serve as their grounds’	(2015: 662). 
But it is unclear how Schaffer could develop this claim. It can’t be that the costs are 
incurred by what serves as the fundamental grounds according to what theories 
explicitly say; the point of the special sciences objection is that the special sciences do 
not make claims about fundamental entities. The claim must be that derivative entities 
incur implicit commitments at the fundamental level, whose cost the Laser can 
measure. But we need an account of this. Schaffer’s wording strongly suggests the 
following: 		(A) A theory T, in positing derivative Ds, incurs an indirect cost in terms of 
fundamental Fs just in case Fs ground Ds. 		
                                                
10 For instance, the issue in the case of Avogadro’s hypothesis was which to choose among 
certain hypotheses concerning the number of atoms in an elemental molecule of gas (Nolan 
1997; Baron and Tallant 2016: 10). 
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But (A) entails that theories positing non-existent derivatives incur no costs 
whatsoever, even at the fundamental level. Thus, suppose telekinetic powers don’t 
exist. Then they lack fundamental grounds. So, given (A), the Laser tells us that 
positing telekinetic powers incurs no ontological costs whatsoever. 	
Furthermore, consider Esther and Feng again. Suppose Feng’s theory is true: the 
fundamental entities are his 10 types of strings, which ground Esther’s 100 types of 
particles. Then (A) seems to tell us that, by the Laser’s measure, Esther’s ontological 
costs were the same as Feng’s all along, since the string types are the fundamental 
entities serving to ground her particle types. This undermines Schaffer’s claim in the 
Esther and Feng argument, that the Laser finds Feng’s theory more economical. So 
here’s a dilemma: If what the Laser counts are the implicit fundamental grounds of a 
theory’s posits, Feng and Esther have the same ontological costs, contrary to 
Schaffer’s claim in the Feng and Esther argument. If what the Laser counts are the 
entities that are fundamental according to what theories explicitly say, then the Laser 
does not apply to theories whose only posits are derivative, contrary to Schaffer’s 
claim in the telekinesis case. 	
Perhaps the solution is to construe implicit costs in terms of the required, rather 
than the actual grounds of derivative entities. But we’d still need an account of the 
relevant notion of ‘requirement’. There are problems, for instance, if we construe it in 
terms of metaphysical necessity: 		
(B) T, in positing Ds incurs an indirect cost in terms of Fs just in case, necessarily, 
if Ds exist, Fs ground Ds.		
(B) entails that theories whose posits necessarily fail to exist have no ontological 
costs whatsoever. Thus, suppose compositional nihilism is necessarily true. Then, 
given (B), the Laser tells us that no chemical or biological theory incurs any costs 
whatsoever, even at the fundamental level, since chemicals and organisms, on the 
assumption that compositional nihilism is necessarily true, necessarily fail to exist and 
therefore they necessarily lack fundamental grounds.11 	
We suggest that Schaffer’s most promising option is to construe the implicit costs 
of non-fundamental theories in terms of the fundamental commitments of their best 
(most complete, rational and plausible) extensions. Thus, the best extension of a 
theory positing genes might include a series of claims about how genes are grounded 
in chemicals, and chemicals in microphysical particles, all in accordance with our best 
science. Thus the best extension of a special science theory contains both scientific 
and metaphysical elements, since such an extension makes grounding claims, which 
                                                
11 Two points: (a) Do not be tempted to reply by arguing that compositional nihilism is false 
or impossible: the plausibility of a principle governing metaphysical theory choice should not 
depend on which metaphysical theories are true! (b) If conditionals with impossible 
antecedents are necessarily true, everything is a cost of positing chemicals, since ‘Necessarily, 
if chemicals exist they are grounded in Fs’ will be true for any F. 
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are metaphysical claims, about certain scientific derivative entities being grounded in 
other scientific entities. The relevant principle would be as follows: 		
(C) T, in positing Ds, incurs an indirect cost in terms of Fs just in case Fs ground 
Ds according to T’s best extension.		
(C) avoids the modal problems with (B) (subatomic particles may ground genes 
according to the best extension of the gene theory, even if compositional nihilism is 
necessarily true). But it is still unclear how (C) copes with non-existent derivatives, 
like telekinetic powers. Given that telekinesis conflicts with our best science, what are 
the Fs, such that the most scientifically and metaphysically plausible extension of the 
telekinesis theory tells us that Fs are needed to ground telekinetic powers? Perhaps 
what matters is that the telekinesis theory cannot be extended in such a way that 
terminates in entities recognised by fundamental physics. Then the problem with 
telekinesis is not that it incurs implicit commitment to certain Fs, but that it is not 
implicitly committed to any Fs that are recognised by fundamental physics. But this 
invites the challenge mentioned above: the problem has nothing to do with economy, 
but with the fact that telekinesis entails, via its best extension, something for which 
our best fundamental physics cannot account.	
	
7.  At this point, we should mention that Schaffer has another strategy for dealing 
with the overgeneration and special sciences objections. This is to modify the Laser 
by introducing ‘some discounted but still non-zero pricing policy for derivative 
entities’	(2015: 658). In other words, even if derivative entities are not an ontological 
free lunch, economy with respect to derivative entities is less important than economy 
with respect to fundamental entities. We agree with Baron and Tallant (2016: 22) that 
this would be an interesting avenue to explore, but requires further development. 
What, for instance, is the pricing ratio between fundamental and derivative entities? 
How would we decide between a theory positing 10 fundamental entities, and 5 
derivatives, and a theory positing 2 fundamental entities and 100 derivatives? We also 
note that such a discounted pricing policy may end up resembling the Razor more 
closely than the Laser, if the pricing ratio is small enough. Finally, the arguments that 
Schaffer gave for the Laser do not seem to support the modified Laser (the 
Esther/Feng case only supports the claim that theories that explanatorily subsume 
others are preferable to them, and the other two arguments are based on an incorrect 
analogy between ideology and ontology), so new arguments will have to be provided. 	
 
8. We have argued that Schaffer’s arguments for the Laser fail. In this section we 
shall first present a different argument for the Laser and then we shall argue that the 





The ontological commitments of a theory can be seen as a conjunction each of 
whose conjuncts asserts the existence of a certain entity. If the conjuncts of T and 
U are mutually independent, and if the conjuncts of T and U have the same initial 
probability then, in these circumstances, if T postulates fewer entities than U, T 
is more probable than U (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002: 205).  
 
The point applies only when the initial probability in question, shared by the 
conjuncts of T and U, is greater than 0 and lesser than 1. Now, the quote above does 
not make clear what kind of probability is in question. But let us think of a situation in 
which different independent fundamental entities f1, f2, and f3 have the same 
epistemic probability,12 i.e. they are confirmed to the same degree by the available 
evidence, and that this epistemic probability is greater than 0 but lesser than 1. Now 
suppose T1 postulates only fundamental entity f1, and asserts that f1 grounds 4 
derivative entities d1, d2, d3, and d4; and suppose that T2 postulates only 
fundamental entities f2 and f3, and asserts that f2 grounds one derivative entity, d5, 
and f3 grounds one derivative entity, d6. Suppose, finally, that the available evidence 
fails to confirm the grounding claims of both T1 and T2. Then T1’s postulation of 
more derivative entities than T2 does not affect its epistemic probability. But although 
the fundamental entities of T1 and T2 have the same epistemic probability, since T2 
postulates more fundamental entities than T1, the epistemic probability of the 
fundamental ontology of T2 is lower than that of the fundamental ontology of T1. 
Hence, T1 has a higher epistemic probability than T2, despite T1 having both a 
greater derivative ontology and a greater total ontology. Thus, in a situation like this 
one should choose T1 over T2. And the result generalizes: in situations like this one 
should choose the theory with a lesser fundamental ontology over the theory with a 
greater fundamental ontology, irrespective of the relative size of their derivative and 
total ontologies. Thus this is a probabilistic justification for the use of the Laser in 
certain circumstances.  
But does the argument above show that the Laser ought to replace the Razor? In 
particular, does it show that it is always innocuous to multiply derivative entities? The 
considerations on which the argument is based support the Laser over the Razor only 
in cases where the fundamental ontologies of the theories in question are different. 
But a crucial case is where theories have the same fundamental ontology but different 
derivative ontologies. What to do in those cases? Is multiplication of derivative 
entities innocuous in that case? No. As we shall now argue, multiplying explanatorily 
superfluous entities makes theories more likely to be defective, in a way that makes 
no exceptions for derivative entities.  
Suppose theory T1 posits 10 fundamental entities and no derivative entities. 
Theory T2 posits those 10 fundamental entities along with 10 derivative entities. If 
                                                
12 For a clear distinction between different kinds of probabilities, namely chances, credences, 
and epistemic probabilities, see Mellor (2005: 7–13).  
16 
 
the Laser replaces the Razor, then the fact that T2 posits an additional 10 entities is no 
reason to choose T1 over T2. This should be the case even if T1 and T2 explain the 
evidence equally well. It is crucial to note, however, that it does not follow from ‘T2 
posits 10 derivative entities’	and ‘T2 explains the evidence’	that the 10 derivative 
entities posited get confirmed by the evidence. An argument adapted from Barnes 
(2000: 363) makes this clear. 	
Let E be the available evidence. Suppose that T1, positing just the 10 
fundamentals, entails E and would explain E if true. Let d be the hypothesis, not in 
T1, that the 10 additional derivative entities exist. Because T1 entails E, we have that 
the epistemic probability of d given T1&E equals the epistemic probability of d given 
T1. Thus, where T1 is assumed true, d gets no confirmation from E. Thus, consider 
T2, which adds to T1 the hypothesis that the 10 derivative entities exist, i.e. d. Even 
though T2 entails and explains E, d gets no confirmation from E. The reason for this 
is that, with respect to the explanation of E, the hypothesis that the 10 derivative 
entities exist is explanatorily superfluous, relative to T1. 	
This alone won’t trouble friends of the Laser. The fact that d gets no confirmation 
from E does not show that T2 is less rationally acceptable than T1 for positing the 
superfluous entities. However, we can reason as follows:13 		(1) If d is not confirmed by any evidence whatsoever,14 then d is rationally 
unacceptable. 	(2) The fact that d is not confirmed by E raises the epistemic probability that d is 
not confirmed by any evidence whatsoever. 	
(3) Therefore, the fact that d is not confirmed by E raises the epistemic probability 
that d is rationally unacceptable.		
Thus, T2 is more likely to be rationally unacceptable for positing the 10 
superfluous derivative entities. This is a reason to choose T1 over T2. Hence, contrary 
to the Laser, multiplying superfluous entities can make theories worse off, in a way 
that makes no exceptions for derivative entities. Consider, once again, Feng’s theory, 
with its 10 fundamental strings, grounding 100 derivative particles. Suppose another 
physicist, Dave, builds on Feng’s theory by positing an additional 200 particles, 
                                                
13 The inspiration here is Barnes (2000: 369), who suggests the following schema to explain 
why theories are worse off for containing superfluous components:  
(A) If p were true, there would be some evidence that requires p for its explanation.  
(B) There is no evidence that requires p for its explanation.  
(C) Therefore p is false.  
(‘If (A) and (B) are conclusively established,’ Barnes explains, ‘then the falsehood of p is 
too…If (A) and (B) are established less conclusively, then p follows more tentatively’). But 
we are concerned about the verificationist overtones of (A).  
14 If a claim follows logically from compelling premises, it is rationally acceptable even if it 
is not confirmed by any empirical evidence. In premise (1), ‘evidence’ is to be construed 
broadly, including both empirical and non-empirical sources of evidence.  
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grounded in the strings. Even though Dave’s particles are derivative, the resulting 
Feng-Dave theory is less rationally acceptable for superfluously positing the particles. 
Let E be the available evidence. Assuming that Feng’s portion of the theory explains 
and entails the available evidence E, Dave’s particles get no confirmation from E, 
making it more likely that there is no evidence that confirms them, thereby making it 
more likely that there is no reason to accept the hypothesis. The superfluous 
derivative particles are therefore costly to the theory. The particles might turn out to 
be useful for explaining some other evidence, in which case, the hypothesis escapes 
censure on grounds of economy. But this would have nothing to do with the particles 
being derivative; it would be because they’ve proven useful.  
Putting the two foregoing arguments together, we can draw the following moral. 
Sometimes, there is more reason to believe a theory rather than another because it has 
a smaller fundamental ontology. But in other cases, there is more reason to believe a 
theory rather than another because, lacking explanatorily superfluous derivative 
entities, it has a smaller derivative ontology. In such cases, the less believable theory 
violates the Razor, because it multiplies entities without necessity, but it does not 
violate the Laser, since the entities multiplied without necessity are derivative ones. 
Thus the Laser cannot replace the Razor. 
 
9. As we said at the outset, there is an important insight behind the Laser: a distinction 
between the ontological costs, and the ontological commitments of a theory. Schaffer 
is right to raise the question of whether all of a theory’s commitments count equally 
towards its costs, especially given the current level of interest in grounding and 
fundamentality. We conclude, however, that the Laser cannot replace the Razor and 
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